Introduction
Crowd-funded markets have recently emerged as a viable alternative for sourcing capital to support innovative, entrepreneurial ideas and ventures (Schwienbacher and Larralde 2010) . As the economic potential of these markets has recently become more apparent, they have boomed.
Marketplaces like KickStarter and IndieGoGo are beginning to facilitate greater transactions, both in terms of volumes and amounts. A recent industry report found that crowd-funding helped new ventures to raise nearly $1.5 billion in 2011, and that number is expected to double in the next year (Massolution 2012) . This explosive growth has resulted in significant attention, from both the media and U.S. legislators, as evidenced by President Obama's recent signing of the JOBS Act (2011) . A consistent feature in the ongoing discussion amongst these parties has been a persistent call for informed regulation and design of crowd-funded markets; a necessary effort to ensure the protection of crowd-funders and entrepreneurs, as well to enhance the efficiency and sustainability of the industry. However, while the formulation of policy and regulation surrounding crowd-funded marketplaces is beginning to garner greater attention, many aspects of crowd-funding have yet to receive rigorous examination (Mollick 2012) . In particular, the behavior of participants, a key factor that must be considered in any policy formulation effort, is not yet well understood.
Crowd-funded markets present a unique combination of collective evaluation and crowd-based fundraising. Contributors, by choosing to pledge funds in support of a project, implicitly undertake the evaluation and selection of that project. This interesting aspect of the crowd-funding process is compounded with the significant potential for social influence in these marketplaces, which stems from the fact that both the timing and amount of other participants' prior contributions toward a particular project are published for all to see. While a number of recent studies have considered the influence of popularity indicators in consumer decision-making within electronic markets Zhang 2010, 2011) , these studies have generally dealt with binary adoption (adopted versus did not adopt) measures (and, in the case of Duan et al, rank data based on these binary measures), presented to visitors in aggregate (e.g., total downloads). In contrast, the temporal and continuous nature of the popularity indicators that are typically made available for consideration in crowd-funded markets makes them deeper and much more complex, both in terms of content and potential influence.
This study examines a crowd-funded marketplace that supports journalists, enabling authors to pitch article ideas to the crowd and to then raise the money necessary to research and publish the piece.
We begin by noting that this crowd-funding platform provides a guaranteed outlet for authors' work and that all published work is subsequently offered freely for public consumption. As such, our empirical analysis is based on the premise that these published stories meet the criteria of a public good (Hamilton 2003; Kaye and Quinn 2010) , a characterization that is further supported by recent research, which has found clear evidence that this online journalism is treated as such by participants in this setting (Aitamurto 2011) . Bearing this in mind, we explore the applicability of two competing classes of economic models that attempt to explain private contribution toward public goods: i) reinforcement models, which predict cooperative or reciprocal behavior and ii) substitution models, which predict altruistic behavior and crowding out. The main research questions that we address are as follows: What
effects do observable indicators of others' prior contribution decisions in a crowdfunded market have on later participants' contribution decisions? Is the pattern of contribution in the funding phase associated with project performance, and, if so, what is the nature of that association?
In most crowd funding markets, the information on prior contribution behavior comprises a project's 'funding status', which offers an observer a richer set of information than more common popularity indicators available in other marketplace contexts (e.g., software download statistics on download.com). An observer can see who has contributed to a project, when they have contributed and, in some cases, even the exact amount they have contributed. The availability of this rich information has important implications for potential contributors' decision-making. For example, the availability of information on the timing of others' contributions allows a potential contributor to gauge the emergence of spikes or lulls in market contribution over time, and to infer future contribution trends. In general,
given these rich signals, it is relatively easy for an observer to compare the contributions of prior others to one another, as well as to his or her own potential contribution. Thus, to capture information about the timing and amount of prior contributions that is available to a potential contributor in the marketplace, we define a new measure, contribution frequency, as the average amount (in dollars) contributed, per period, as of a given point in time.
This work adds to multiple literary bases in the fields of information systems, marketing and economics. First, we consider a novel product type that has seen limited consideration by information systems researchers. Whereas much of the online public goods research in IS has looked at P2P file sharing, we consider the production of digital journalism, a cultural, experience good. Second, whereas prior work in marketing and IS has looked at binary indicators, we consider deeper measures that are both temporal and continuous. Third, we explore an entirely new context and process that combines crowdbased fundraising and collective evaluation. While economists have conducted a variety of online public goods experiments in the past, none, to our knowledge, have explored this combination of private contribution and collective evaluation. Moreover, most of this prior work uses data collected from surveys, lab and field experiments, which do not offer the level of granularity (amount, time, and contributor of every single funding action for more than 18 months) present in our dataset. Fourth, ours is the first work, to our knowledge, that has explored a context in which subjects are faced with the possibility of contribution toward an array of public goods (e.g., multiple simultaneous projects undergoing funding); typically, lab experiments have looked at subjects' contributions toward a single public good. Lastly, we leverage proprietary data in the form of web traffic statistics, allowing us to empirically examine the consequences of different behaviors in the funding process on later outcomes. This last aspect is key, as this allows us to model both the antecedents and consequences of the crowdfunding process, simultaneously exploring the process and its.
The main results of our analysis are as follows: we find evidence of a substitution effect in peoples' contribution to this marketplace for crowdfunded online journalism, which suggests that altruism is a key incentive to contribute in this marketplace. More specifically, as individuals observe others contributing more frequently, the amount they are inclined to contribute falls (an increase of 1% in the prior frequency of contribution is associated with a 0.31% decrease in subsequent contribution). This substitution effect suggests that contributions are subject to crowding out. That is, the marginal utility contributors gain from giving to a particular project in the marketplace is diminished by others' contributions. Importantly, since our findings are based on contribution frequency, this also suggests that the duration over which prior contributions have arrived plays an important role in individual contribution decisions 2 .
Further, we find that funding duration also plays an important, indirect role in determining the readership (performance) of stories upon publication. Longer funding durations appear to lead to greater levels of pre-publication pitch exposure and market awareness, which in turn leads to greater consumption. This finding appears to validate the suggestion, often raised by both the media and academia (Belleflamme et al. 2010) , that a chief benefit of crowd-funding is its ability to generate attention for entrepreneur's ventures, prior to implementation. All of our findings are robust to a variety of different model specifications, operationalizations, estimators and data splits. Our analyses also suggest some possible avenues to predicting the performance of crowd-funding projects, both in terms of their likelihood of achieving funding thresholds, as well as the audience they are likely to draw once implemented. This is important, given that the midstream evaluation of collective intelligence processes is an acknowledged challenge in the literature (Bonabeau 2009 ).
In the following sections, we begin with a review of the relevant literature pertaining to crowdfunded markets and private contribution toward public goods. We then discuss our expectations, based on theory, of the influence of contribution behavior on subsequent potential contributors, as well as the relationship that such signals will have with project quality. Finally, we present details of our empirical evaluation and a discussion of the implications of our findings for both practitioners and scholars dealing with crowd-funded markets. 2 We have assessed alternative specifications focusing upon cumulative and average prior contribution, finding that a model based upon prior contribution frequency offers the best fit to the data. These results are reported in Appendix B.
Literature Review

Crowd-funding
There is an emerging stream of research that has examined the concept of crowd-funded markets. Schwienbacher and Larralde (2010) have defined crowd-funding as "the financing of a project or a venture by a group of individuals instead of professional parties." These authors provide an overview of the concept, based on an earlier review (Belleflamme et al. 2010) , noting the still embryonic stage of the phenomenon's emergence. Schwienbacher and Larralde report that a number of platforms have arisen in support of online crowd-funding over the last 4-6 years. The earliest successful example is Sellaband.com, a Dutch-based marketplace in which musical artists raise funds to produce and sell an album. Agarwal et al. (2010) examined this marketplace to evaluate the influence of proximity, amongst other factors, on individual investment behavior, re-evaluating the 'flat-world hypothesis'.
Another prominent example of a crowd-funding marketplace is the peer-to-peer lending site Prosper.com. Lin et al. (2012) and Zhang and Liu (2012) have examined Prosper in an attempt to identify the types of information that individuals consider in crowd-funded marketplaces when making contribution decisions. Lin and his colleagues conclude that the likelihood of credit being issued is greater when the borrower exhibits greater social capital (e.g., a larger social network), as lenders appear to take this as a sign of credibility or trustworthiness 3 . Zhang and Liu find, counter to intuition, that lenders are more likely to herd when the borrower exhibits signals of low quality. They interpret this as a rational decision, likely made because the lender assumes that others have some private knowledge about the borrower that they are not privy to. In contrast, when a borrower exhibits high signals of quality, lenders are less likely to join a herd, likely because they perceive the herd as simply a reflection of the borrower's observable quality.
Though the literature on crowd-funded markets is quite limited, there is a wide body of related work. Particularly relevant is the stream of research that has examined the effects of popularity indicators on adoption and consumption decisions. An example of this work is the study by Tucker and Zhang 3 It is important here to note that Prosper.com, while related to crowd-funding as defined above, is slightly different. In the Prosper marketplace, individuals seek interest-bearing loans, rather than contributions or investments. That is, each loan is to be repaid in full by the borrower, plus interest, regardless of how the money is used and regardless of whether any associated project succeeds. Further, the purpose of the loans is highly varied and dependent and need not pertain to a specific project. In addition, the funding process is quite different from a typical crowd-funded market as borrowers obtain loan offers on Prosper.com through a second price auction process, rather than an open, unconstrained contribution process that takes place continuously over the funding period. (2011) , who consider wedding vendor service adoption in the presence of popularity statistics, based on prior adoption decisions captured in the form of hyperlink click-through rates. These authors find that publication of these popularity statistics causes the formation of a "steep tail," attracting new outsiders to what was previously a niche product choice. Interestingly, they also find that this occurs without cannibalizing consumers from competitors' market share. Similarly, Duan et al. (2009) , considering users' downloads of free software from download.com, observe severe changes in software download rates when published product rankings shift, suggesting that consumers take prior downloads as a signal of product approval and quality. Lastly, Salganik et al. (2006) , manipulating download statistics for songs in an online experiment using an artificial marketplace, find that variation in the presence and ordering of prior download volumes directly influences the inequality and predictability of song success. Thus the decisions of prior users have the potential to influence subsequent users, as is evidenced by the above noted work.
Public Goods
The influence of information about others' prior decisions on those of later deciders is not limited to studies of private goods. The public goods literature is also replete with comparable studies that pertain to individuals' contributions toward public goods in the presence of "social information" (e.g., information on others' contributions). This is particularly relevant in our study context because we are dealing with private contribution toward the production of online journalism. In many cases, this has been argued to constitute a form of public good (Hamilton 2003; Kaye and Quinn 2010) , but more importantly, in our case, the crowd-funded platform provides a guaranteed venue for publication, and offers all material freely on the Internet, without need for subscription. As such, while it may be true that online journalism does not always meet the criteria of a public good, this is certainly the case in our context (Aitamurto 2011) 4 .
In the public goods literature, there are generally two contrasting classes of models that have been proposed that predict different directions of influence from prior others' contributions on the amounts contributed by later deciders: reinforcement models and substitution models (Shang and Croson 2009 ).
As one might expect, reinforcement models are those that predict that greater initial contribution will have a positive effect on later contributions, whereas substitution models are those that predict that initial contributions will have a negative effect on later contributions.
Broadly speaking, reinforcement models are based on the mechanisms of reciprocity, fairness and social norms -a need to contribute fairly, rather than leave others to bear the burden of supporting the public good on their own. A key examples of the reinforcement literature is the model proposed by Sugden (1984) , which is rooted in the idea that everyone will seek contribute at least as much as the leastgenerous contributor, out of a sense of moral purpose. Similarly, the model proposed by Bernheim (1994) is based on the idea that individuals will rarely deviate from social norms because they are worried about how others will perceive them. Thus, when one observes others contributing in greater amounts, these models predict that contributors will be inclined to donate in kind.
In contrast, substitution models are generally explained by the concept of altruism and the warm glow effect (Andreoni 1989 (Andreoni , 1990 . In these models, individuals allocate their resources between contributions to private goods and public goods. The reason individuals contribute to public goods, it is argued, is that they derive some utility from their own consumption of the good, as well as others' consumption (i.e., from aiding others). However, as the level of others' contributions rises, the volume of the public good that is available increases such that the marginal benefit to an individual from contributing falls, because others are meeting the "need" of the public good. The end result of this is that the individual will tend to reallocate their funds more toward private consumption activities as this takes place (Roberts 1984) , an effect generally referred to as crowding out (Andreoni 1990 ).
In terms of empirical work on private contribution toward public goods in an online setting, research examining online journalism has been quite limited. One of the few examples of this research is the study by Borck et al. (2006) , who surveyed individuals to obtain data on voluntary contribution of funds in support of an online German newsletter as well as their perception of others' contribution to the 5 We would like to thank the Associate Editor for suggesting this reference.
same. These authors found that individuals would contribute in accordance with reinforcement models, attempting to match their contributions to the amounts donated by others. Shang and Croson (2009) point to the limitations of using data collected through surveys and lab experiments to test the relation between others' contribution and ones' own giving to charitable causes. Our data, on the other hand, offers a very fine level of granularity by capturing data about the amount, date, and contributor of every single funding actions made by all the participants in the marketplace for more than 18 months.
Though online journalism has received only limited attention, there is fortunately a wide body of related work that has studied private contributions to peer-to-peer (P2P) file-sharing networks. This context has perhaps received the greatest attention from scholars focused upon private contribution toward public goods online. However contributions by individuals in P2P networks are usually made in terms of data (such as music, videos) uploaded, and not so much in monetary terms. Interestingly, said work has presented mixed evidence in support of reinforcement and substitution models in P2P networks. Xia et al. (2011) , Gu et al. (2009) and Nandi and Rochelandet (2008) have all found evidence of reinforcement models, reporting that P2P contributors behave in a reciprocal manner. Xia et al. (2011) found that individuals are more likely to continue contributing if they receive greater benefits from the network, reflecting a reciprocal relationship. Gu et al. (2009) similarly found that P2P file sharers contribute their content in a reciprocal manner, though in their study the behavior was found to be enforced through explicit sanctions on deviants (bandwidth throttling for downloads by free riders).
Lastly, Nandi and Rochelandet (2008) again found evidence of reciprocity, though the primary focus of reciprocal contribution in their case was on ensuring diversity of content, rather than volume or availability.
Other work, however, has found clear evidence in support of substitution models. Research that examined one of the first P2P file sharing networks, Gnutella, identified rampant free-riding behavior (Adar and Huberman 2000) , a direct indication of a substitution effect. Subsequent work on Gnutella, conducted a few years later, found that this behavior had only grown more prevalent over the intervening period (Hughes et al. 2005) . Asvanund et al. (2004) , studying participant behavior across multiple file sharing networks, also found evidence of free riding. Further, those authors found that the prevalence of this free riding grew stronger as the network grew in size.
Given the conflicting findings noted above, the directionality of social influence stemming from information on prior contributions in online networks is not easily inferred for a given marketplace. This is likely because the direction of influence will depend on a variety of factors, such as the contributors' motivations or incentives and the degree to which contributors' decisions are observable to others or convey status and social identity. A number of these factors are potentially at play in a crowd-funding market. Contributors may be driven by a sense of altruism, to help the author and support others who might benefit from the story. Alternatively, contributors may have a personal interest in the proposed story topic. Crowd-funders' decisions may be influenced by concern over social image, if they perceive that their actions are highly observable to others in the market. In contrast, if crowd-funders feel that they have a sufficient degree of anonymity, they may be more inclined to withhold their funds and simply consume content as it is produced.
While the directionality of social influence is not immediately obvious in this setting, it is quite likely that individuals' contribution decisions in crowd-funded markets are highly dependent on the behavior of other contributors, just as they are in P2P networks and other, offline examples of private contribution to public goods. This is because, by drawing on information about prior contribution behavior, crowd-funders are easily able to assess the impact of their own potential contribution relative to those of others. We make this potential clear in the following section, where we provide details of the marketplace's operation and the available information signals.
Study Context
In this section we detail our study context in order to make clear the relevance of the above discussion and to provide a basis of understanding for the subsequent empirical analysis. The market we consider is a crowd-funded platform (Agarwal et al. 2010; Kappel 2008; Schwienbacher and Larralde 2010) Any member in the community can choose to pitch a story to other members of the community 6 . A pitch is a proposal to publish a story on the website, and includes a description of the story topic, the proposer's qualifications, as well a list of planned deliverables and a budget. Other members of the community can then choose to contribute funds toward the pitch in any increment they wish. The contribution phase continues in this manner until the story is completed and published on the website.
Figure 1 provides a graphical depiction of the timeline of article funding and publication.
FIGURE 1 Funding and Publication Timeline
Community members' preferences are indicated to others by their observable contribution history.
Once a community member contributes toward a pitch, this becomes public record. When reviewing a pitch, a list of all prior contributors is provided to the observer, along with their specific contribution amounts, the date and time of their contribution, as well as the aggregate contribution that has been made up to that point by all community members. Screenshots of the marketplace are provided in Figure 2 , depicting the format in which these pieces of information are presented.
While prior work has examined the role of popularity indicators as signals of quality, driving subsequent adoption behavior ), in our case, the potential impact of observable prior 6 It is important to note that very few members of the marketplace act as both contributors and authors, even though this is possible. Of the 4,515 unique contributors present in our dataset, only 72 are authors contributing to the pitches of others. A notable implication of this is that contribution behavior cannot be attributed to a tit-for-tat strategy.
decisions is more complex. This is because the two classes of public good contribution models that we have outlined above provide contradictory predictions. On the one hand, reinforcement models predict that participants, upon observing prior contribution actions and amounts, will seek to contribute in kind out of a desire to be fair or to fit in. In contrast, substitution models predict that participants will react quite differently, lessening their contributions as they observe the arrival of funding from elsewhere. We give more detailed consideration to this in the following section, where we outline the relevant variables we consider in our empirical analysis and the directionality of influence that each class of public good contribution model would predict. 
Methods
Model Formulations
Empirical evaluations of the role of 'social information' in determining subsequent private contributions toward a public good have generally focused on prior others' contribution amounts. For example, a large body of work has examined the crowding out effect, drawing on archival data to understand how increases in government spending influence individuals' private contribution levels (Abrams and Schitz 1978; Kingma 1989; Reece 1979) . More relevant to the present paper, however, are The above being said, it is also important to note that most prior research has explored the effects of prior others' decisions in what is, or is assumed to be, a relatively static environment. The efforts of Andreoni (1998) , Vesterlund (2003) and Varian (1994) are rare exceptions to this as these authors consider contribution sequencing. This is quite likely because the vast majority of study contexts considered have not offered observers temporal information that would indicate how long an adoption or contribution process has been going on. Yet, in a crowd-funded market, this timing information is readily available and is quite likely to play an important role in contributor decision-making. Given that a potential contributor can quickly see how long a project has been raising funds (based on its posting date)
as well as the funds that have been raised to date, it is likely that they will assume the rate funding arrival.
To illustrate this point, consider the following example. Consider a hypothetical subject who is a potential contributor in a crowd-funded marketplace. This subject has the option of donating to one of two projects: X and Y. Both projects have raised $300 thus far, however, project X has been posted in the marketplace for 30 days, while project Y has only been posted for 10 days. Given this information, our subject should reasonably infer a contribution arrival rate of $10/day for project X, and an arrival rate of $30/day for project Y. Our subject is likely to infer that contributions are arriving more quickly for project Y than for project X.
In an effort to incorporate this temporal information into our empirical model, we propose a new measure that captures the frequency of contribution. We define contribution frequency as the amount in dollars contributed to a given pitch, divided by the duration of a pitch's funding in the marketplace, as illustrated above. Our logic for evaluating the fit of either a substitution or reinforcement model to the data is as follows: a greater prior frequency of contribution will incite cooperation and reciprocation in the case of a reinforcement effect (a positive coefficient) or it will cause later contributors to withhold their funds in the case of a substitution effect (a negative coefficient).
Whether in terms of a reinforcement effect or substitution effect, temporal information has an important bearing on the social information conveyed via cumulative prior contribution. This is because the duration over which the cumulative contributions have arrived will often be construed of future contribution trends. So, if a given level of prior contribution has arrived in a relatively shorter period of time, an observer will infer that a greater volume of subsequent contributions are likely than would otherwise be the case.
In the case of a substitution effect, where prior contribution crowds out subsequent contribution, this obviously has implications for the strength of the effect that will be observed for a given level of prior contribution. If that prior contribution arrived more quickly, the crowding out effect might be expected to be larger. In the case of a reinforcement effect, a number of scholars have shown that the reciprocity effect fades with time (Burger et al. 1997; Flynn 2003) . Thus, given a particular level of prior contribution, if it was received over a longer duration, the desire to contribute in kind may be weaker.
In addition to the above, we need to consider a number of other factors that reflect a potential contributor's prior behaviors and influencers, as these will determine his or her ultimate decision about whether to contribute and how much to contribute. In particular, web traffic is a direct determinant of the number of potential contributors, as one must visit the page in order to contribute funds. Greater web traffic generally captures greater interest in a pitch on a particular day, for whatever reason. Thus, web traffic statistics capturing the number of page views are also included in our model as a contribution predictor. We also include the lag of contribution as a predictor, in line with the prior literature , to capture word of mouth effects.
Further, though the focus of this study is the influence of preference indicators and how aspects of the funding process may be associated with project performance, we must also control for some important pitch characteristics associated with contribution behavior in our analysis. First, we include the amount of the pitch's required budget that remains outstanding as of a given time period, in dollars. The impact of potential contributors' awareness of the outstanding budget for a given pitch is difficult to predict. A greater volume of funds required may result in a desire to assist the author. Alternatively, this may be perceived as somewhat of an insurmountable goal, and thus pitches may have a harder time attracting initial funding. We also control for static features of a pitch, such as pitch genre or length, in addition to unobservable heterogeneity, through the use of panel fixed effects 7 .
Finally, in order to ensure our model is identified, we also account for exogenous sources of influence on contribution behavior, such as the pitch topic's popularity in the mainstream media and on the broader Internet. We address these factors by including results from Google Search trends for each pitch observation, employing 2-5 keywords that were manually extracted from each pitch. These keywords included any proper nouns in the pitch title, as well as story topic tags assigned to the pitch by the website purveyor. Again, the prevalence of individuals searching for these topics on Google on a given day is expected to capture the broader popularity of the article content in society 8
. We provide more details subsequently.
Antecedents Model
All non-categorical variables in our antecedent analyses are log transformed, thereby allowing us to identify percentage changes in effect. This was deemed appropriate primarily because the required budget and daily contribution for a given pitch, as well as the popularity of different stories, vary widely, so understanding contribution effects in percentage terms is significantly more useful (Keene 1995) . For a given pitch, i, on a given day, t, the final, complete model is reflected below, by equation (1). Here, is a vector of time fixed effects, which controls for temporal changes in the marketplace 9 , while is a vector of pitch-level fixed effects 10 . A list of all variables included in our model of the antecedents is provided in Table 1 .
Our evaluation of the antecedent model is conducted via time series regression employing the Arellano-Bover/Blundell-Bond system estimator (Arellano and Bover 1995; Blundell and Bond 1998) , an extension of the original Arellano-Bond estimator (Arellano and Bond 1991) , allowing us to instrument for the lag of the dependent variable using the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM). The original GMM estimator developed by Arellano and Bond (1991) is generally known as the "difference GMM"
(DGMM). This estimator treats the model as a system of equations, one for each time period. The equations differ only in their moment condition sets. However, Arellano and Bover (1995) , as well as Blundell and Bond (1998) , later noted that lagged levels could be weak instruments for first differences if the autoregressive process is too persistent over time, as is possible in our case. In order to address this issue, these authors proposed the "system GMM" (SGMM) estimator in which the original, uninstrumented equations are added to the system. The idea is to estimate instrument differences with lagged levels and instrument levels with lagged differences. It is this latter estimator that we employ in our analyses.
-----INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE-----
Admittedly, higher order lagged variables might not be ideal instruments since it is possible to have common demand shocks correlated over time, in which case lagged variables would be correlated with the current period demand shock. However, common demand shocks correlated over time are conceptually similar to trends. Hence, a suitable control for correlated demand shocks or trends can 9 To clarify, changes in the marketplace over time might include things such as seasonality effects (e.g., contributors having lower volumes of disposable income in the tax season). 10 We do not incorporate author fixed effects into our model as the vast majority of authors in our sample have pitched only a single story. As such, author fixed effects are highly collinear with pitch fixed effects and lead to qualitatively similar results.
alleviate this problem in the GMM estimation (Archak et al. 2011) . Our Google Search Trends control variable thus alleviates any potential concerns in this regard. To alleviate any concerns about a high instrument count in the GMM estimations, we also use a collapsed instrument set comprised only of low order lags, as this has been shown to produce more reliable results in scenarios where the instrument count is on the higher side (Mehrhoff 2009 ). Thus, our additional estimations add credibility to our findings.
We then assess the reliability of our findings by re-estimating all formulations using two stage least squares with date and pitch-level fixed effects (2SLS). The 2SLS estimation allows us to report additional tests statistics to evaluate model validity (exogeneity of regressors) and instrument strength, in support of our initial GMM-based dynamic panel estimates. We conduct numerous other robustness checks. We attempt to address any lingering concerns about the lagged dependent variable by employing the lag of web traffic to the pitch, as well as the lag of total contributions to other projects on the site 11 , as alternative instruments. Further, we estimate a standard OLS regression excluding the lagged dependent variable. Next, we re-estimate our models employing alternate measures of prior contribution (cumulative prior contribution and average prior contribution in place of frequency) and different data splits (e.g., excluding null observations and outliers), to assess the stability of our coefficient estimates 12 .
Consequences Model
Next, we develop a model linking aspects of the funding process to the story's performance after it is published. Unlike in the funding phase, where the unit of analysis is a pitch, in the publication phase, the unit of analysis is a story. In particular, we focus here upon anecdotal claims that one of the key benefits of the crowd-funding process is that it offers entrepreneurs the ability to garner awareness and attention for their venture before it is implemented, thereby boosting consumption (Belleflamme et al. 2010) . We begin by considering the duration of the funding process for a story's associated pitch, as it is likely that longer funding durations provide greater opportunity for the market to become aware of a 11 The logic behind using the lag of total contributions to other projects as an instrument for the lag of contributions to a focal pitch is that the instrument should be associated with contributions to the focal pitch, but is unlikely to be associated with prior period contributions to the focal project.
12
A number of these robustness checks are presented in Appendix B, including an analysis of cumulative and average prior contribution (in place of frequency), as well as an analysis of story genre. In general, these analyses suggest that: i) contribution frequency is a better explanatory variable than cumulative or average contributions, which ignore temporal aspects, and ii) story genre is not a major factor in determining contribution behavior.
forthcoming story. We then delve deeper, noting that funding duration is not a direct measure of attention, consider a direct measure of exposure: total pitch views.
Our outcome of interest here is story readership (seconds of read time), though we do also consider an alternative specification, employing the total number of page views. In order to accurately assess these relationships, we also include a number of relevant control variables that are likely to influence readership. We control for the length of a story's text and we include a measure of text complexity (readability), as both of these values are likely to result in longer read times. Various kinds of readability metrics have been used in prior work, for example in the literature on user-generated content Ipeirotis 2006, 2011) . Further, we control for the budget of the pitch. We also once again include a measure of Google Search Trends for the story, for reasons identical to those outlined for the model of antecedents, as well as the length of time that has passed since the story was first published, to capture the influence of saliency, timeliness or relevance. Finally, we control for other static aspects of a story, as well as temporal trends, by including fixed effects for story and week. A table of all variables included in our model of the consequences is provided in Table 2 .
-----INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE-----
For a given pitch, i, on a given day, t, the final, complete model for the consequences portion is reflected by equation (2). This model is similar to the antecedent model, though the dependent variable constitutes count rather than continuous data. As such, we employ negative binomial regression. Here, the fixed effects are introduced via the dispersion parameter (Hausman et al. 1984) , an approach that allows us to retain static variables in our estimation.
read _ time it = ! 0 + ! 1 * log( funding _ duration i ) + ! 2 * log(story _ length i ) + ! 3 * log(readability i ) + ! 4 * log(search _ trends it ) + ! 5 * log(weeks _ posted it ) +
The dependent variable is left untransformed, as recent research suggests that count models typically perform better in this scenario (O'Hara and Kotze 2010) Once again, we follow the initial model estimation with a number of robustness checks. As noted above, we re-estimate the model taking the number of readers in a given week as the outcome of interest.
We also explore the inclusion of a lagged dependent variable here (once again to control for word of mouth effects, similar to the antecedents case). Because count estimators generally do not do well in the face of the autocorrelation issues introduced by a lagged dependent variable, we offer estimations that once again employ the Arellano-Bover/Blundell-Bond estimator.
Dataset
We collected our data from a variety of sources. First, the purveyor of the marketplace provided us with access to proprietary data in the form of web traffic statistics for the marketplace via a Google Analytics account. Using this account, one of the authors then developed a piece of software to programmatically retrieve time series data of web traffic statistics for each URL, by day, leveraging the Google Analytics Data Export API.
Second, we developed a software application to retrieve all available public information from the website about pitch and story characteristics. This information includes such things as the date on which a pitch was proposed, the amount of funding received on any given day, who contributed to a pitch and the amount of each contribution. It also includes the required budget outstanding for a pitch as of a given day, whether a pitch was located on the main landing page of the marketplace as of a given point in time and the date an associated story was published by the author. Finally, one of the authors manually retrieved time series data on Google search trends for 3-5 keywords associated with each pitch and story. , and in order to ensure consistency between our two analyses, we limit our consideration to those stories published on or after this date, as well as the contribution observations for associated pitches that take place on or after this date 13 . The timeline diagram provided in Figure 3 clarifies the nature of our data set.
FIGURE 3 Data Timeline
13 Because it might be argued that such an approach introduces the potential for positivity or selection bias, in that our analysis is limited only to those pitches that completed the funding process, for the sake of robustness, a 2SLS estimation was performed on the entire set of pitch observations, from August 26, 2009, onward. Similar findings were obtained in terms of both sign and magnitude of the regressors. Further, a simple model without the Google Analytics data was analyzed, evaluating all contributions from March 9 th , 2009 onward, and the results were again qualitatively similar to those reported in our Results section.
As per the diagram, for our primary antecedent model, we consider only those pitch contribution observations (aggregate contribution by all users, in a particular pitch, on a particular day; pitch-day pairs) that took place on or after August 26, 2009, in order to ensure the availability of web traffic details associated with URL views. Of the 154 pitches that received some contribution in the marketplace over this period, 100 completed the funding process during the period of observation and are thus considered in our analysis. Of the $126,654.97 contributed in the marketplace over this period, these 100 pitches accounted for $66,016.21, supplied by a total of 4,353 contributors. Based on this, contribution appears to be distributed across pitches in a reasonably uniform manner, with 65% of the pitches receiving 52% of the funding.
The remaining variables we include in our analysis of the antecedents are the required budget outstanding for a pitch as of a given observation and Google Search trends for associated pitch keywords.
A pitch enters our sample on August 26, 2009, or when it is initially posted for consideration, whichever is most recent. The pitch then exits on the date an associated story is published.
Our dependent variable in the antecedent model, contribution toward a given pitch on a given day, is the sum of all contributions toward that pitch on that day. Our antecedent sample is comprised of 5,874 pitch-day pairs. The average pitch takes 54.5 days to complete the funding process, though there is considerable variation, with the fastest pitch having completed funding in 1 day, while the slowest completed funding in 294 days. The average completed pitch receives funds from 40 unique contributors.
However, once again, there is considerable variation around the mean, with the number of contributors ranging from just 1 to as many as 175. This is understandable, however, as at the time of data collection, the pitches observed have raised from as little as $20 to as much as $7,685. Thus, the number of contributors required to supply these funds will vary quite a bit. The average individual contribution is $6.01 and contributions range from $0.28 to $4,749. We present the descriptive statistics of all the variables in our antecedent model in Table 3 .
-----INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE-----
The data set we employ in our analysis of the consequences model is very similar to that used in the antecedent model. In contrast to the antecedent analysis, however, we aggregate the consequence data to weekly values, for the sake of manageability. As stories remain available for viewing continuously following publication, the considered period of readership for a given story tends to extend for a much longer duration than the associated pitch's funding phase. As noted earlier, our sample includes all those stories published from August of 2009, onward, as well as each story's associated pitch contribution data.
The associated pitch contribution data is used to calculate a summary measure of contribution frequency for each pitch. Beyond this summary statistic, we again leverage a continuous indicator of Google Search Trends. The descriptive statistics for our second sample are provided in Table 4 .
-----INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE-----
Results
Antecedents
We begin by exploring the effect of various lags of the dependent variable, in an effort to identify the extent of autocorrelation in the data. The results of these estimations are presented below in Table 5 .
Based on these results, we determined that only the first and second lags of contribution have a significant effect on contribution in the present period. Based on this, we chose to employ 3 rd + order lags as instruments in our Arellano-Bover Blundell-Bond estimations, as well as in our 2SLS estimations.
Importantly, this analysis of lags has little bearing on our determination of a substitution or reinforcement effect. This is because, as outlined above, the information available to potential contributors about others'
contributions is generally presented in aggregate (i.e., it consists of aggregate funding to date, and the total duration over which it has arrived). Though an observer could drill down into the contributor list to determine the total funds contributed the day prior, unlike the aggregate details, this information would take some effort to extract.
-----INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE-----
Next, we consider the results of our antecedent model, which are, presented in Table 6 . First of all, looking at the tests of autocorrelation, we see that AR(3) is insignificant in all models. This is in line with our above analysis, as it indicates that autocorrelation is insignificant at the 3 rd order. Looking at the coefficient estimates in column 3, we find that contribution frequency has a significant, negative effect (! 1 =-0.32; p < 0.01). This estimate is stable, regardless of whether control variables are included, such as remaining budget or search trends. Based on these estimated coefficients, a 1% increase in prior contribution frequency is associated with a 0.32% decrease in contribution. This suggests that higher contribution frequencies are associated with lower subsequent contribution amounts. As such, the direction of these effects is consistent with a substitution model, rather than a reinforcement model.
Further, the size of the coefficient here seems to suggest that partial, rather than complete crowding out, is observed (as the coefficient is less than 1, dollar-for-dollar crowding out is not implied).
-----INSERT TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE-----
Moving next to our pitch URL traffic variables, we again find significant results. In particular, the effect of prior period contribution is significant and positive (! 2 =0.29; p < 0.01). More specifically, a 1% increase in the volume of prior period contribution is associated with a 0.29% increase in subsequent contribution. The positive coefficient of this variable indicates the presence of word of mouth effects or general inertia in contribution behavior. We also find that greater numbers of users viewing a pitch on a given day are associated with more money being contributed (! 3 =1.29; p < 0.001). That is, a 1% increase in the number of pitch views is associated with a 1.29% increase in contributions, a rather intuitive result.
With regard to our other control variables (i.e., remaining budget, search trends), we find no significant effects.
Our estimates are qualitatively similar across all hierarchical regressions, thus our coefficients appear to be quite stable estimates. Further, the Hansen J test of overidentifying restrictions cannot be rejected in any of our regressions, and the difference in Hansen test does not allow us to reject the exogeneity of our instrument variable set.
Consequences
Shifting next to a consideration of our consequences model, we find a number of interesting results (Table 7) . Firstly, looking at the basic model, in column 1, we find that the pitch funding duration is positively associated with story readership (e !1 =0.22; p < 0.001), as expected. This effect remains stable when we introduce the control for pitch budget (column 2). Most importantly, however, when we introduce our direct measure of pitch exposure (pitch views), we see that it is also positive and highly significant. Further, we see that the significance and magnitude of the funding duration coefficient falls.
This seems to support our intuition that longer funding durations will lead to greater awareness, and thus consumption, following a story's publication.
With respect to the various controls in our model, we can see that most of our controls have significant effects in the expected direction. First, longer stories induce greater read times. Second, complexity, or text that is difficult to read (i.e., a high value on the readability index), induces longer read times. Third, older stories draw smaller read times, likely because the stories grow less interesting or topical as they age. Lastly, regarding the coefficient for pitch budget, it is quite possible that we do not see a positive effect here because larger budgets are typically associated with overhead costs, and not expenditures directly associated with story content 14 . It is important to note that the significance of this coefficient disappears when we control for story topic genre -we direct the reader to Appendix B for these results.
-----INSERT TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE-----
The significance and directionality of the pitch_views coefficient suggests that stories with pitches that remain in the funding phase longer, tend to perform better, because they garner greater awareness in the marketplace before a story is published. Drawing on the log-likelihood of each of these nested models (columns 2 and 3), we also performed a likelihood ratio test, which indicated that the inclusion of the pitch_views variable significantly improves the model fit ( ! 2 (1) = 42.68 , p < 0.0001). This is not surprising, given that the magnitude and significance of the pitch views coefficient are both larger than those of associated with the funding duration coefficient. In order to provide a richer analysis of these associations, we also performed a case comparison, drawing on three high and three low performing stories (in terms of readership). These results are presented in Appendix C.
Robustness Checks
We begin our robustness checks by ruling out issues of multicollinearity. To assess multicollinearity, we estimated both the antecedent and consequence models using cross-sectional (pooled) OLS regression and obtained the variance inflation factors (VIFs) associated with each variable.
All values were found to be below 4, and hence multicollinearity is not of concern in our sample.
We next evaluated the robustness of our coefficient estimates, in the antecedent model, to outliers. To do this, we re-estimated the model using the GMM-based Dynamic Panel estimator, excluding outlier observations that were identified based on a frequency value that lay within the top 5% of the distribution (this resulted in 395 excluded observations, or roughly 7% of the antecedent sample).
This re-estimation produced coefficients that were very similar in terms of sign, statistical significance, and magnitude.
We also explored the sensitivity of the results to the choice of estimator. We re-estimated the model using the two-stage least squares estimator with fixed effects (2SLS). In this re-estimation, we instrumented for the lag of the dependent variable using time-series based instruments (i.e., higher order lags of the same variable). This model again supports our core findings, producing an insignificant Hansen J statistic, which indicates that the overidentifying restrictions are not rejected. Further, the Cragg-Donald statistics in these estimations are ~45.0, which exceeds all Stock-Yogo cutoff values, indicating that our instrumentation is quite strong (Stock and Yogo 2002) 15 .
To address any concerns about the validity of time series instruments, we also estimated a 2SLS model taking the lag of total contributions to other pitches as an instrument for the lag of contributions to a focal pitch. As noted previously, the logic here is that site-wide contributions on a given day should be correlated, but that contributions to other pitches should not be highly associated with prior period 15 Notably, our Kleibergen-Paap F and LM statistics both exceed the Stock-Yogo cutoffs as well.
contributions to a focal pitch. These results again produced the same results, and produced similar statistics in terms of instrument strength. Next, in order to mitigate any concerns over the frequency variable potentially being endogenous, we estimated the model with the 2SLS estimator once more, instrumenting for both the lagged DV and the contribution frequency using higher order lags. This estimation again produced qualitatively similar results 16 .
We then estimated a standard OLS regression with fixed effects, excluding the lagged dependent variable, in order to address any concerns about this variable being confounded with contribution. Upon doing so, we obtained coefficient estimates consistent with those reported elsewhere.
Lastly, we re-executed our initial GMM-based dynamic panel data model including a variable that captures the number of days a pitch has been posted for. This model produced qualitatively similar results, and the duration variable was found to be insignificant. This estimation helps to rule out the alternative explanation that the effects we observe are simply a result of available funds running dry (i.e., the project reaching its market contribution capacity). It is interesting to note here that, in addition to further addressing the market capacity argument, inclusion of this posting duration variable also allows us to rule out an effect of waning interest, over time. To clarify, this check is necessary because one might reasonably suggest that pitches that have been posted for a longer duration of time will contain older ideas. As news is only valuable if it is recent, such pitches could be expected to draw less interest from readers. All of the results for these various regressions are reported below, in Table 8 .
-----INSERT TABLE 8 ABOUT HERE-----
In terms of robustness checks for our consequences model, beyond the simple checks for multicollinearity and outliers, we also explored alternative operationalizations for readership. Table 9 provides the results of our main estimation, taking page views as the outcome of interest, rather than read time. Again, we see similar results. Further, we once again explored the impact of replacing total pitch views with total pitch read time (independent variable), and we obtained similar findings. 16 It is important to note as well that the 2SLS regression reported in Table 10 also included an orthogonality condition, to evaluate the exogeneity of contribution frequency. The resultant C statistic suggested that we could not reject this variable's exogeneity (i.e., an insignificant C statistic; Chi 2 (1) = 0.354), further supporting our belief that frequency is exogenous.
-----INSERT TABLE 9 ABOUT HERE-----
Next, we evaluated the robustness of our results to inclusion of a lagged readership variable, in order to address possible issues associated with autocorrelation. This was achieved by incorporating a non-zero lagged value of the dependent variable (i.e., max(lag_page_views, 0.5). While the autoregression term was significant in this estimation, our other coefficient estimates remained stable in terms of sign, significance and magnitude. An alternative approach to this concern might be to employ an innovation diffusion model (Mahajan et al. 2000) , however, given the stability of our findings in the face of an autocorrelation term, we do not pursue such modeling here.
Further, we re-estimated our consequences model using the Arellano-Bover/Blundell-Bond estimator, as was done in our antecedent estimations. These results are also stable and consistent with our prior coefficient estimates. Thus, the presence or absence of the lagged dependent variable does not appear to influence our results. The results of the Arellano-Bover/Blundell-Bond estimation are presented below in Table 10 .
-----INSERT TABLE 10 ABOUT HERE-----
It should also be noted that we performed a number of additional robustness checks across both the antecedent and consequence models, to explore the effects of story topic genre, as well as different operationalizations for prior contribution (cumulative prior contribution, average prior contribution).
These additional robustness checks are presented in Section 10, Appendix B.
Discussion
We also considered some possible alternative contribution incentives, beyond those we explicitly factored into our empirical model of contribution's antecedents. We considered the possible role of reputational gains, social identity, sanctions on deviants and money. Beginning with reputational gains, it is important to note that many of the contributors in this marketplace employ "user names" or pseudonyms. For this reason, contributors are, in general, fairly anonymous. Moreover, the marketplace does not enable lenders and borrowers to connect in the form of teams or groups, such as those at Kiva.com and Prosper.com. It therefore seems unlikely that a contributor could obtain much in the way of reputational gains from a contribution. For similar reasons, it seems unlikely that individuals would view contribution as a viable opportunity to establish social identity or to associate themselves with a cause. In terms of sanctions on deviants, there do not appear to be any mechanisms by which sanctions could be imposed. We say this because a) users are generally anonymous, as noted above, and b) there does not appear to be any avenue by which an individual could be penalized by the community. Finally, with regard to monetary incentives, to our knowledge, there are no means by which a contributor could earn funds as a result of their contribution. We therefore feel confident that our empirical model strikes a good balance between parsimony and exhaustiveness.
While we have identified a substitution effect in this setting, we expect that one might be more likely to observe a reinforcement effect in contexts where crowd-funders are concerned with their own behavior relative to that of others. For example, it is quite possible that the magnitude of these negative effects may decline (or become positive) as crowd-funding activities become more social. For example, consider crowd-funding for medical expenses (e.g., giveforward.com), where the majority of funders are quite often in the fundraiser's own social network and thus may also be known to one another as well. If a crowd-funder's identity is known, their actions are observable and they perceive those observing them to be important, then they are more likely to be concerned about how they will be perceived. Further, in such a setting, it is easier for potential funders to gauge other contributors' relationships to the project proposer and thus assess whether those contributions are truly "fair".
In a reward-based crowd-funding context, this positive sway may also begin to occur as marketplaces like Kickstarter and IndieGoGo begin to incorporate social networks and thus greater visibility (e.g., the Facebook Social Graph). As contributions become more social, and more visible, then social norms are again likely to become more salient. This is in contrast the present context, where crowd-funders appear chiefly concerned with the value of their contribution to the recipient (i.e., if they have received more funds previously, then they are less likely to value additional contributions quite as much). Contributors in this marketplace are largely anonymous and are not connected to each other through a social network, thus social norms may be less important to contributor decision-making. In short, here, individuals are likely less concerned about how they are perceived by others (thus they will be more willing to lessen their contributions). Similarly, morals and fairness may play less of a role, as crowd-funders may be unsure about the relationship between other contributors and the project proposer (perhaps the other contributors offering large sums of money are friends or family, and thus are contributing over and above what might be considered fair, due to a stronger social relationship). If this perception were to manifest, then a given contributor might not perceive the other contributions as being representative of what is "fair" or "moral".
The usefulness of popularity or preference indicators in predicting subsequent product popularity has been demonstrated previously within certain online contexts, such as YouTube (Cha et al. 2007; Duan et al. 2009; Tucker and Zhang 2011) . However, no prior work has attempted to examine how users' reliance upon these types of indicators might play out in the context of private contribution toward a public good, nor how this reliance might be associated with the quality of the public good once implemented. The empirical study conducted herein presents a unique effort to analyze these effects.
While other scholars have recently examined private contribution toward a public good in the context of communities of practice (Wasko et al. 2009 ) and peer to peer file sharing networks (Asvanund et al. 2004; Krishnan et al. 2002; Nandi and Rochelandet 2008; Xia et al. 2011) , this work advances the literature, examining contribution behavior around a new product type (online journalism), subject to the influence of observable contribution decisions made by prior others. Further still, our web traffic and product popularity variables allow us to address the fact that certain stories will have a broader appeal than others.
That being said, the possibility remains that certain types of stories will attract different types of people, who contribute in different ways. As such, while we have identified the predominant influence in this marketplace (altruism and warm glow), it is possible that this marketplace is in fact made up of a combination of altruists and conditional cooperators.
The availability of data spanning 1.5 years allows us to gain an understanding of the longitudinal process underlying consumer decision-making in the presence of the aforementioned signals. While prior work has considered process characteristics of this form, it has done so with comparatively limited scope, examining, for instance, how the behavior of one reviewer will influence that of subsequent reviewers (Forman et al. 2008; Schlosser 2005) . Our examination has thus allowed us to gain a more in-depth understanding of the influence that multiple signals have on contributor decisions, in tandem. These effects are rather complex, and suggest that users consideration of such signals (e.g., relying on them to different degrees and in different ways in different scenarios) may be highly dependent upon context. Our identification of a significant association between total pitch views and story readership also implies that pitch exposure is key to the success of crowd-funded projects, not only in terms of garnering funding, but also in terms of building awareness in the marketplace to achieve greater levels of consumption.
Implications for Practice
Our paper solidifies the important role of online social influence in collective evaluation and crowd-based funding. Further, our paper empirically supports the notion of the substitutive effects in contribution toward public goods, providing some practical evidence, in a real-world setting, of a phenomenon that has been examined at length via simulation and laboratory experiments (e.g., Carpenter
2007; Eckel 2008). Our findings provide evidence that users do consider the behavior of others in this context, and they suggest that this influence is contingent on the nature of the good in question. Whether this consideration takes place consciously or inadvertently is left as a subject for future research.
In terms of the implications of our findings for policy and regulation, the identification of social influence in this market raises the potential that some markets may enable fundraisers to 'game' or manipulate the system (Bonabeau 2009 ). This would be true, for example, if the market exhibited a mechanism of reciprocity, or if herding behavior were prevalent (Burtch 2011; Zhang and Liu 2012) .
However, importantly, our findings demonstrate that reinforcing mechanisms are not guaranteed to emerge in all markets. As such, the need for involvement from regulatory bodies should likely be weighed on a case-by-case basis. Further, there is ongoing research in the area of manipulation resistant feedback mechanisms that could quite likely offer an avenue to mitigating the threat of gaming, even where viable, further diminishing the need for regulatory oversight (Resnick and Sami 2008) .
The existence of a substitution effect also has interesting implications for individuals seeking to raise capital within electronic markets, as well as individuals seeking to consume, invest or contribute in said markets. This finding suggests that crowding out may actually have countervailing effects. On the one hand, it may make it more difficult for pitch proposers to meet their funding targets. On the other hand, crowding out may drive longer periods of funding, allowing pitch proposers to gain greater awareness in the market before implementing the project. However, the importance of these countervailing effects will, of course, depend on the structure of a particular marketplace. For example, in other crowd-funding contexts, the funding duration may be fixed in advance, or it may not be necessary for a project to meet its funding goal in order for implementation to take place 17 .
Our findings also indicate that the awareness or attention that a pitch receives in the funding stage ultimately impacts the consumption of its output, once the project is implemented. This seems to suggest that our measures may constitute a useful information source from a managerial perspective. If measures like funding duration or pitch views can be leveraged to improve upon predictions of consumption, then such information could be leveraged for inventory management and sales forecasting purposes. Of course, the degree of improvement delivered from the use of our measures should also be given consideration in future work.
If the crowd-funding platform wished to mitigate the identified substitutive effect, it is important to consider the findings of associated work that has examined different approaches to boosting contribution toward public goods in the presence of crowding out. List and Lucking-Reiley (2002) consider two such treatments: subsidization and the offering of refunds. These authors find that both approaches successfully increase contribution levels, as both approaches effectively lower the marginal cost of contribution. In the case of subsidization (i.e., matching contributions), a given contributor's donation to a project is effectively increased by some multiple, by the purveyor's contribution. In the case of refunds, a potential contributor is given the peace of mind that they can withdraw their funds from a project at any time during the course of the funding process, if they should change their mind. Thus, a reasonable suggestion would then seem to be for the crowd-funding platform to match contributions. However, the effects of subsidization can likely be improved if a more nuanced approach is taken.
Prior work has found that different types of contributors are more or less susceptible to information on contributions made by prior others when making their own decisions. In particular, Shang and Croson (2009) found that first-time contributors are more likely to positively reinforce the contributions of others than are repeat contributors, because first-time contributors are faced with a greater degree of uncertainty or ambiguity. With this in mind, providing subsidies to mitigate the substitutive effect might work best if targeted at one type of contributor versus another. First time contributors could be targeted with an initial, one time account credit upon registering with the marketplace, whereas matching contributors' donations in general could be a strategy to target repeat-contributors.
It is also important to consider the underlying psychological effect that drives the positive influence of contribution matching on individuals' willingness to contribute. In work related to the idea of subsidizing contributions toward a public good, Falk (2004) finds that supplying potential contributors with a small gift amplifies the amount they are willing to contribute toward a charity, as it incites reciprocal behavior. Returning to the notion of impure altruism and the warm glow effect, where contributors receive some utility from aiding others, the influence of subsidization that is identified in the above studies may in fact result from individuals' perception that the subsidy is a type of gift to them, as it amplifies their contribution. With this in mind, it is therefore possible that the initial gift need not be monetary in nature to achieve the same outcome. As such, perhaps if the crowd-funding platform were to provide other types of gifts to potential contributors, this might serve to boost contribution levels. For example, the platform might consider offering free merchandise associated with the platform brand, or some form of recognition, when contributors surpass some threshold of contributions (e.g., a "premium contributor" designation on the website).
Conclusion
This work presents a holistic analysis of the process of consumer decision-making in a crowdfunding context. Our findings seem to suggest contributions in this marketplace are subject to a crowding out effect. This, in turn, suggests that individuals in this market may be primarily motivated by altruism.
Further, we find that the duration of the fundraising project indirectly impacts the ultimate consumption of the project's output, as this determines the amount of exposure the pitch receives in the marketplace before it is implemented. In particular, longer funding durations are found to be associated with higher performance. This finding suggests that it may be possible to leverage data on aspects of the contribution process in the earlier stages to predict later performance.
We have presented one of the first empirical attempts to understand the influence and implications of behavioral signals in crowd-funded marketplaces. With the emergence of "crowd-funding" as a viable business model, such marketplaces are providing users with the opportunity to express themselves in new ways, and to examine others' behavior in new ways. The nascent body of literature on crowd-funding will likely benefit greatly from further consideration of these types of signals. !
The results of our empirical analysis need to be understood in light of some limitations. Our data set does not allow us to draw direct association between pitch contributors and story readers. We observe these behaviors in aggregate, but are unable to determine whether the exact same individuals contributing funds are also reading the story that results. Similarly, while we have identified a negative effect on allocations toward a particular project by the market, it is likely that all crowd-funders do not behave in the same manner; some may be altruists and others conditional cooperators. Our descriptive regression simply indicates the predominant behavior in the market. Further, it is possible that, while contributions fall off for a particular project when prior contributions arrive more frequently, it may be that the market simply reallocates funds to different projects that are most in need. Further, it has been shown that in certain charitable contexts, the crowding out effect may actually be driven by a strategic response on the part of fundraisers, as opposed to donors (Andreoni and Payne 2003) . While this appears unlikely in our context, given that very little marketing effort appears to be undertaken by pitch proposers (fundraisers) directly, the possibility remains that this is contributing to our findings.
Generalizability may be an issue, as the subject of the contribution is somewhat subjective in terms of its quality, being a form of 'art', experience good. Future research can build on our analysis by using data on funding and project outcomes from other crowd-funded markets. Future research can also explore the relationship between popularity indicators, behavioral signals and more traditional, explicit forms of investor or purchaser preference (e.g., online product reviews) in the prediction of subsequent sales performance (Archak et al. 2011) . Finally, future work might also seek to elaborate upon the initial relationship we have identified here between the contribution frequency of the pitch and the performance of the published story, in terms of readership.
In conclusion, given crowd-funding's significant economic potential, the design of these platforms warrants a good deal of caution. While numerous avenues for future research do remain, this work presents an initial step toward understanding individuals' behavior in these markets. As such, it is our hope that this work will provide insights to scholars and practitioners, informing design, as well as policy and regulation going forward. Google search trends associated with pitch keywords. 6. posting_duration
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ROBUSTNESS CHECKS
APPENDIX B: Supplementary Robustness Checks
In addition to the primary Antecedent and Consequence models we report above, we also explored secondary models with alternative operationalizations of others' contribution, in place of prior contribution frequency. We felt this was necessary because we acknowledge the potential that crowdfunders might not concern themselves with funding durations (i.e., that they might only be concerned with aggregate prior contributions to the public good). In the below analyses, we propose and consider alternative measures, including cumulative contribution and average contribution (per contributor) 18 . Further, we perform additional robustness checks by controlling for the genre of the pitch/story.
Cumulative and Average Contributions
To begin, Table 11 , below, provides our re-estimations of the main model using cumulative and average contribution, in place of contribution frequency. We would expect the effect of cumulative contributions to be in line with that of frequency, however, we would also expect cumulative contribution to slightly less explanatory, given that it ignores time. Estimating this different model using the AB-BB produces results consistent with this expectation. The overall model Chi-square is much lower here than that of our main model, reported in Table 6 (~630 versus ~810) and, while both coefficient estimates are highly significant, the magnitude of the coefficient for frequency is three times that the coefficient for cumulative contribution. Next, re-estimating this model using 2SLS produces qualitatively similar results. Finally, we re-estimated our primary model using average contribution in place of contribution frequency, where average contribution is defined as the average contribution amount, across all prior contributors. From the results of this re-estimation, we see that average contribution is significant and in the expected direction, however, this model also produces a poorer fit statistic than the main model. The Wald statistic is roughly 690 while the Wald statistic of roughly 810 in Table 6 . This suggests that the average of prior contribution has less explanatory or predictive power than the frequency of prior contribution.
Story Topic Genre
We also explored the possibility that contribution behaviors might vary by story topic or genre. We collected additional data from the marketplace to incorporate this aspect into our models. As we show in the detailed analysis below, doing this does not qualitatively change the results we have reported above.
The marketplace purveyor maintains a set of story topic tags that are assigned to each article upon publication. We manually retrieved the tags for each of the stories in our dataset and incorporated them into our regression models using dummy variables. We provide a plot on the following page (Figure 4) , indicating the counts of stories that have been assigned each tag. It is important to note that these tags are not mutually exclusive; a given story can be assigned multiple tags. The marketplace maintains 17 unique topic tags, of which 15 appear in our data set. The mean and median tag averages for all stories in our data set are 3.82 and 4.00, respectively, while the story having the broadest subject matter was assigned a total of 13 tags. The most prevalent topic tag is "Government + Politics" with 49 stories, while the least prevalent is "Consumer Protection."
FIGURE 4 Story Frequency by Topic !
We next explored the possibility of differences in funding and readership across story genres by incorporating dummy variables into our regression models for different topic tags. We first estimated our antecedent model incorporating dummy variables for each story category, to determine if this would influence our key coefficient estimates (i.e., to confirm the presence or lack of any significant differences between story categories, beyond what would be captured by a fixed effect term). We find that including topics does not appear to significantly influence the estimated effect of contribution frequency. That is, our key variable (contribution frequency) remains stable in the presence of these dummies. The results of this regression are reported below in Table 12 . Further, we obtain qualitatively similar results using a 2SLS estimator or an OLS estimator without the lagged dependent variable. We next re-estimated the consequences model to see if the story topic might influence readership. Table  14 , above, provides a re-estimation of our negative binomial model. Incorporating the topic dummy variables into the model does not qualitatively change our key coefficient estimates, with one exception -our pitch budget variable becomes insignificant, which suggests that there may be some budgetary trend associated with story genre that is driving the negative effect in our main estimations.
Lastly, we explored whether there is a significant interaction between the effect of total pitch views and story topic, focusing on the top two most common story topics in our sample ("Government + Politics" and "Wealth + Poverty"). The results indicated that there are no significant interaction effects, and all other coefficients in our model remained consistent with prior estimations in terms of sign, significance and magnitude.
APPENDIX C: Story Readership Case Analysis
